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Abstract 
The Carsington Dam failure is huge disaster that it was impacted many people died and a lot of 
houses been destroyed. That case arose many questions as it could be caused by numerous 
factors such as lack of design or construction could be the main factors that influence that failure. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze some factors that have been impacted the failure of 
Carsington Dam, this research also will explore the condition before and after construction have 
been done.    
The failure which took place in the dam was likely to have been caused by inadequate material 
strength which is influenced by certain factors such as lack of design and/or construction and 
exposure to destructive chemical substances  
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Abstrak 
Keruntuhan Carsingtom  DAM adalah sutau musibah yang sangat dahsyat yang menyebabkan 
banyak kerugian jiwa maupun harta benda. Oleh karenanya perencanaan dan pelaksanaan 
yang sangat hati-hati dan penuh perhitungan sangat dibutuhkan. Keruntuhan yang terjadi di 
Carsington Dam di Derbyshire United Kingdom adalah salah satu contoh musibah yang 
menyebabkan kerugian material maupun inmaterial. Penyebab Keruntuhan  tersbut dapat 
disebabkan banyak faktor seperti kegagalan mekanis, degradasi material maupun kesalahan 
prosedure pelaksanaan. 
Tujuan dari penulisan adalah mengkaji penyebab keruntuhan dari Carsington DAM dengan 
memperhitungakan kondisi pra dan pasca pembangunan dari DAM tersebut. 
Dari analisa yang dilakukan bahwa faktor utama yang menyebabkan keruntuhan adalah 
rendahnya kualitas material yang digunakan yang diakibatkan proses degradasi karena bahan 
kimia  juga ditambah beberapa faktor seperti kualitas perencanaan yang rendah dan proses 
konstruksi yang tidak ketat.  
 
Kata kunci: Carsingtom DAM, , Pra and Pasca Konstruksi, Keruntuhan DAM. 
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1. Intoduction 
 
 The purpose of this report is to 
present the results of the study of the 
slope stability of Carsington Dam. This 
dam is an earth embankment dam for a 
water supply scheme and located in 
Derbyshire. The study consisted of two 
major parts. 
• The pre-construction stability analysis 
 This analysis was based on the 
values of drained shear strength 
parameters used by the original 
designer. Since no information could be 
found in the literature regarding the 
values of porewater pressure assumed 
by the designer, a range of values of ru 
were used in the analysis. A selection of 
other parameter values was also used to 
illustrate the effect of cohesion on the 
value of the factor of safety. 
 
• The post-failure stability analysis 
 This analysis was based on the 
values of drained shear strength 
parameters obtained from the extensive 
site investigation and lab testing 
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programme carried out after the slope 
failure. In addition, chainage 725 was 
selected as the reference section to 
represent the failure condition and the 
geometry of the dam. 
 To help carry out the analysis, a 
computer software SLOPE, which is part 
of the OASYS software package, was 
used to determine the factor of safety of 
the embankment against slope failure. 
 Finally, this study is enriched by 
additional information provided by Mr. 
Richard Chalmers, the representative 
from Babtie Geotechnical, in 
accordance with the actual pre and 
post-failure treatment of the Carsington 
Dam. 
 
2. Site Description 
 Carsington Dam is located near 
the village of Hognaston in Derbyshire 
and has a maximum design height of 35 
m. Plan of the Dam is presented in Fig. 1. 
This Dam was due to finish placing of 
filling material back in May 1984 when a 
crack was reported on the dam crest of 
its upstream part. This crack enlarged 
and had not stopped until 6 June, with 
the berm enlargement continued for a 
few more days. In chainage 675 m, the 
upstream toe had moved 13 m laterally 
and had lifted by about 2.5 m in 
addition of severe disruption of the 
upstream slope (Fig. 2).     
 
 
 
Figure 1. Plan of Carsington Dam 
(chainage and elevation in 
meters) 
 
 
Figure 2. Failure in Carsington Dam at 8 
June 1984 (chainage and 
elevation in meters) 
 
 An early exploratory trench at 
chainage 620 m revealed the slip plane 
in the base layer and gave some 
understanding of the distortion at the 
toe. Further extensive exploratory works 
in trenches at chainage 720 m and 825 
m (Fig. 2) provided more information 
and allowed sampling of embankment 
and foundation materials. From survey 
and interpretation, the geometry of the 
failure surface was derived and is 
presented in Fig. 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Geometry of the failure surface 
in chainage 725 (failure line is 
highlighted red) 
 
From trial pits and trenches both under 
the dam and in the ground beyond the 
upstream toe, the succession of 
foundation strata was established and is 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Geology of the foundation 
strata 
Site 
Identification 
Pit Logs 
Classification and 
Description 
Topsoil TS Topsoil 
Subsoil a1 
Head Deposits, Stiff 
brown and grey friable 
clay 
Yellow Clay 
(a) 
a2 
Firm and stiff light grey 
and yellow/orange 
mottled clay. Both a1 
and a2 contain some 
angular/sub-angular 
sandstone and 
limestone fragments, 
and rare rounded quartz 
pebbles 
Yellow Clay 
(b) 
b1 & a2 
Weathered Bedrock, 
Soft to stiff grey, brown 
and yellow mottled clay 
with rare sandstone and 
coal fragments (residual 
soil) 
Dark Clay b3 
Soft dark grey and black 
clay with some very 
weak mudstone peds. 
(Highly brecciated and 
completely weathered 
mudstone) 
Brecciated 
Mudstone b4 
Dark grey laminated, 
highly weathered 
mudstone, very weak 
Blocky 
Mudstone b5 
Dark grey laminated, 
moderately weathered 
mudstone 
 
 
 After the failure had occurred, a 
total of 1260 soil samples were taken 
and a comprehensive series of tests 
initiated. As the result, the geotechnical 
properties of the dam materials could 
be generalized and are presented in 
Table 2 (Fig. 4 as reference). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Geometry of the dam at 
chainage 725 m (before 
failure) 
 
3. Pre-Construction (Initial) Stability 
Analysis 
3.1 Circular Slip Failure Analysis 
 For this analysis, the dam was 
assumed to be made of homogeneous 
material with a unit weight of 20kN/m3. In 
addition, groundwater level was set to 
be deep below the ground surface and 
circular failure surface was specified. The 
2-D appearance of the Dam is shown in 
Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. 2-D appearance of the 
Carsington Dam as an input 
data for OASYS-SLOPE 
 
  
 
 Table 2. Geotechnical properties of the Carsington Dam strata 
Peak Post-peak Residual 
No. Material 
Pit Log 
Symbol 
γ  
(kPa) c' 
(kPa) 
Φ' 
(°) c' (kPa) Φ' (°) c' (kPa) Φ' (°) 
ru 
1 Breaching  - 18.5 -  - -  -  -   - 0 
2 Fill Material b4 21 15 21 0 21 0 12 0 
3 Core material a2,b1,b3 18.5 15 21 0 21 0 12 0.42 & 0.53 
4 Yellow Clay a2,b1 18.3 10 20 0 20 0 12 0 
5 Mudstone b3,b4 18.5 20 20 20 20 10 23 0 
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     Table 3. Parameters for initial slope stability analysis 
Set c’ (kPa) Φ’ (°) ru Notes 
1 20 27 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 Original parameter set 
2 20 23 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 Φ’ reduced (based on further testing) 
3 5 23 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 c’ reduced 
4 2 23 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 c’ reduced further 
5 0 23 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 purely frictional material (c’ = 0) 
 
 
 
 This analysis was done using 
OASYS-SLOPE programme to find the 
minimum factor of safety against slope 
failure (failure occurs if factor of safety 
just less than 1.00). The parameters used 
are presented in Table 3. 
 In the program, several features 
were chosen to be reliable for this 
analysis: 
o The downstream slope (1:2.5) was the 
steepest slope of the homogeneous 
material dam. Thus, this slope was 
assumed to produce the lowest 
factor of safety against shear failure 
and therefore was chosen to be 
analysed in this part. 
o Bishop’s and Janbu’s method were 
chosen instead of Fellenius because 
the material was considered drained. 
Since both of those prior methods 
showed similar results, only the 
Bishop’s method results are presented 
in this report. 
o Parallel Interslice Forces method was 
used to carry out the calculation of 
factor of safety based on the shear 
strength of the slope. 
o Circular slip surface type was chosen, 
with the direction of slip downhill. 
o The least amount of slope failure 
weight was set to be 100 kN. 
o Co-ordinates of common points 
which all failure circle must pass were: 
 
A(x = 49m, y = 20m) and B(x = 126m, y 
= 50m) (see Fig. 6  for reference). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Graphical Output of  Slope 
Stability Analysis (x=49m, 
y=20m) using OASYS-SLOPE 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Graphical Output of  Slope 
Stability Analysis (x=126m, 
y=50m) using OASYS-SLOPE 
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The results of the analysis are presented 
in the Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Results of the initial slope stability 
analysis 
Set ru 
common 
point 
circle 
centre 
FoS Comment 
1 A (49, 20) (62, 112) 1.513 
 
0.2 
B (125, 50) (200,122) 1.771 
OK 
 A (49, 20) 64, 108) 1.183 
 
0.4 
B (125, 50) (200,120) 1.380 
needs 
attention 
 A (49, 20) (66, 104) 0.855 
 
0.6 
B (125, 50) (198,114) 0.994 
FoS < 1, 
failure 
2 0.2 A (49, 20) (64, 106) 1.321 Ok 
  B (125, 50) (200,120) 1.532  
 A (49, 20) (66, 102) 1.043 
 
0.4 
B (125, 50) (198,114) 1.207 
needs 
attention 
 A (49, 20) (68, 100) 0.765 
 
0.6 
B (125, 50) (198,114) 0.880 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
 
3 
 
0.2 
A (49, 20) 
 
(48, 142) 
 
1.008 
 
needs 
attention 
  B (125, 50) (210,156) 1.232  
 A (49, 20) (52, 132) 0.752 
 
0.4 
B (125, 50) (208,148) 0.924 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
 0.6 A (49, 20) (52, 134) 0.498 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
 
 
ru 
B (125, 50) 
 
 
(206,142) 
 
0.618 
 
Comment 
4 A (49, 20) (34, 174) 0.920 
 
0.2 
B (125, 50) 
(216, 
178) 
1.155 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
needs 
attention 
 A (49, 20) (38, 164) 0.667 
 
0.4 
B (125, 50) (216,176) 0.848 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
 0.6 A (49, 20) (38, 166) 0.418 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
 
 
ru 
B (125, 50) 
 
(216,176) 
 
0.544 
 
Comment 
5 A (49, 20) (28, 96) 0.816 
 
0.2 
B (125, 50) (230,224) 1.087 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
needs 
attention 
 A (49, 20) (28, 96) 0.570 
 
0.4 
B (125, 50) (230,224) 0.784 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
 A (49, 20) (28, 96) 0.324 
 
0.6 
B (125, 50) (234,238) 0.481 
Fos < 1, 
failure 
 
3.2 Non-Circular Slip Failure Analysis 
(Two-Wedge Analysis Method) 
 This analysis used the dam 
geometry at chainage 725 (Fig. 4). This 
cross sectional view was transformed 
into a simplified two-wedge model as 
presented in Fig. 6. In addition, this 
analysis assumed a homogeneous dam 
(as in the initial slope stability analysis) 
and used parameter Set 5 (c’ = 0 kPa, 
Φ’= 23°) with ru = 0.2 (see Table 2 for 
reference).  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Simplified two-wedge model of 
the cross section at chainage 
725 
 
 From Fig. 8 above, the plane 
surface can be separated into two 
wedges with vertical interfaces with an 
inter-wedge force P1 and P2. If P1 = P2 
then the correct value of factor of safety 
(F) has been chosen. In other words a 
trial approach is required by adjusting 
the value of F until convergence is 
achieved (Fig. 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Simplified two-wedge model of 
the cross section at chainage 
725 
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 From Fig. 9 above, the magnitude 
of P1 and P2 can be found from a 
polygon force providing an assumption 
about its inclination mq f=  
or tan tan '/ Fq f= , where 'mf  
represents the mobilised angle of 
shearing resistance.  The magnitude of 
total force W1 and W2 were obtained 
from the area of each wedge multiplied 
by the unit weight of soil. 
 A polygon of forces can be 
drawn for wedge 1 and 2 as shown in 
Fig. 8. The magnitude and direction of 
c’L1 / F and c’L2 / F are known. The 
direction of N1’ and N2’ are known. The 
resultant R1 of the frictional component 
is assumed to act at the angle 'mf from 
the direction of N1’ (the same procedure 
to R2). The direction of P1 and P2 are 
assumed so the polygon can be closed 
and thus, the value of P1 and P2 can be 
measured. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Simplified two-wedge model 
of the cross section at 
chainage 725 
 
 
 After several attempts, the most 
reasonable convergence value of 
factor of safety was approximately 1.25. 
Several calculation results are presented 
in Table 5 . 
 It can be concluded that 
because the factor of safety is above 
1.00, thus the dam is considered to be 
safe against slope stability failure. 
 
Table 5. Results of the two-wedge 
analysis 
FoS P1 (kN) P2 (kN) P2 - P1 (kN) 
1 2400 4500 2100 
1.2 2600 2800 200 
1.25 2700 2750 50 
1.3 2800 2300 -500 
1.5 3200 2200 -1000 
 
 
4. Post-failure Stability Analysis 
 For this analysis, the geometry of 
the dam was taken from chainage 725 
as presented in Fig. 4. The position of the 
non-circular failure surface was taken 
from the approximated failure line in Fig. 
3. The input geometry for the SLOPE 
programme is presented in Fig. 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Input Geometry for SLOPE 
(failure line is highlighted 
red) 
 
 Basically, this analysis used the 
drained shear strength parameters 
tabulated in Table 2 in order to find the 
combination that gains the factor of 
safety of 1.00 (approximately) with 
consideration of the peak, post-peak, 
and residual value of the parameters. 
This is with the assumption that failure will 
occur when the factor of safety of the 
dam against shear strength is just less 
than 1.00. 
In the program, several features were 
chosen to be reliable for this analysis: 
o Janbu’s method was chosen because 
this was the only method that could 
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be applied for non-circular slip in the 
SLOPE software. 
o Parallel Interslice Forces method was 
used to carry out the calculation of 
factor of safety based on the shear 
strength of the slope. 
o Non-circular slip surface type was 
chosen, with the direction of slip 
downhill. 
o The least amount of slope failure 
weight was set to be 100 kN. 
o The water table was set to be equal 
to the total head level of the 
piezometers. 
 The values of pore pressure ratio 
(ru) were 0.42, 0.53, and 0.00 for the core, 
boot, and yellow clay respectively. 
Because of the limitation of the SLOPE 
software, the information had to be 
inputted in the form of a piezometric 
grid (Fig.12).  The piezometer water level 
can be calculated using the equations 
as follow: 
 
H z h= +   where  
soil soil u
water
h rh g
g
´ ´
=    
  H = piezometer water level / total head 
(m) 
  Z = elevation head (m) 
  h = pressure head (m) 
  hsoil = height of embankment above 
the piezometer tip (m) 
  γsoil = unit weight of soil above the 
piezometer tip (kN/m3) 
 γwater = unit weight of water (9.81 kN/m3) 
 
 
Figure 12. Position of the piezometer grid 
at the input geometry 
 
 Since the materials that were 
involved in the failure are the yellow clay 
and the core material, only these 
materials were tested in the SLOPE-
programme. In addition, the yellow clay 
material was divided into two terms: 
 
yellow clay 1: the clay material near 
the core’s boot and 
under the fill 
yellow clay 2: the clay material near 
the embankment’s 
end 
 
 This division was with respect to 
the measured post-failure strength 
properties of the clay 
 After several attempts, the 
minimum and most reasonable 
properties to stabilize the slope and 
make the factor of safety equals 1.00 
are as shown in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
          Table 6. Results of the post failure stability analysis 
Core and 
Boot 
Yellow 
Clay 1 
Yellow Clay 
2 
No. Description 
Φ’ 
(°) 
c’ 
(kPa) Φ’ (°) 
Φ’ 
(°) c’ (kPa) 
Factor of Safety 
1 peak values 21 15 20 20 10 1.409 
2 
post peak 
values 21 0 20 20 0 1.242 
3 
predicted 
values 17.5 0 15 20 3 1.001 
4 residual values 12 0 12 12 0 0.762 
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In table 6, yellow clay 1 material refers 
to the clay material near the core’s 
boot and under the fill, while yellow 
clay 2 refers to the clay material near 
the embankment’s end. 
 
5. Discussion 
 The Carsington Dam failure arose 
many questions as it could be caused 
by numerous factors which can be 
physical (mechanism of failure), 
chemical (material degradation) or 
administrational (construction method). 
 In this report, the discussion is 
limited to the physical factors which are 
narrowed to the factors of design and 
material properties. As the result, the 
term “Factor of Safety” is selected to 
be the governing condition of the 
design to judge the material properties 
of the dam.  
 
o Circular Slip Failure Analysis 
 The simplified homogenous 
model of the dam was tested with 
several physical-material conditions 
and with the assumption of circular slip 
failure. From the results in Table 3, 
several characteristics are obtained:  
- Set 1 gives the most optimistic 
result of FoS while Set 5 gives the 
most pessimistic one. It can be 
concluded that reduction of c’ 
and Φ’ values decreases the FoS. 
This shows that the material 
strength governs the stability of the 
slope. 
- Increase in the ru value lowers the 
FoS, in other words, increase in 
pore water pressure reduces the 
stability of the embankment. 
 Although some results of the 
analysis show that failure will occur in 
the model, this is not a problem since 
this analysis was not meant to value the 
stability of the Carsington Dam (not 
with so much simplification). 
 This analysis is to determine 
whether the governing material 
strength and physical conditions may 
influence the slope stability. And based 
from the characteristics above, this 
analysis succeeds to find that the 
material strength (i.e. c’ and Φ’ values) 
and the pore water pressure govern the 
stability of the slope. 
 
o Non-Circular Slip Failure Analysis 
(Two-Wedge Analysis Method) 
 Different from the previous 
analysis, this analysis is meant to test the 
dimension of the Carsington Dam 
against reasonable material properties 
and pore water pressure condition in 
order to approximate the likely FoS 
against slope failure. 
 From this simplified analysis, the 
FoS was approximated to be 1.25. Thus 
the dam is considered safe against the 
test values. Although this analysis used 
many simplifications (e.g. homogenous 
materials, simplified dimension, etc), it is 
still representative to describe that the 
failure which took place in the dam 
was caused by inadequate material 
strength and/or higher pore pressure 
value. 
 
o Post-failure Stability Analysis 
 This analysis was done in purpose 
to approximate the actual material 
properties that would likely to cause 
failure of the dam. This analysis is the 
most sophisticated from all, introducing 
the post failure measured values of the 
materials as a benchmark for the 
analysis. 
 The analysis result (Table 5) shows 
that for the factor of safety to be equal 
to 1.00, the strength properties: 
• Core and boot :  Φ’ = 17.5° ; c’ = 0 
kPa 
• Yellow clay 1 :  Φ’ = 15° ; c’ = 0 kPa 
• Yellow clay 2 :  Φ = 20° ; c’ = 3 kPa 
 
 It is obvious that the strength of 
the core and boot and the yellow clay 
1 are located between their post-peak 
and residual values and especially the 
yellow clay 1, it’s values is located near 
it’s residual values (Φ’ = 12° ; c’ = 0 
kPa). This characteristic is relevant to 
the measured condition of the dam 
(Fig. 13) in chainage 725 that shows the 
yellow clay near the boot to be nearly 
residual.   
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Figure 13. Horizontal movements on line 
XX and vertical strain in the 
core (chainage 725) 
 
 
 From this analysis, it can be 
concluded that the materials in the 
embankment dam had different 
conditions. In this case the core and 
boot material and the yellow clay 
material (especially near the boot) 
were estimated to be below their post 
peak values. This reduction of strength is 
likely to be the cause of the slope 
failure. 
 In overall, the whole analysis of 
the Carsington Dam has come to a 
general understanding that the slope 
stability failure was likely to have been 
caused by the inadequate material 
strengths. In accordance, certain 
factors such as lack of design and/or 
construction and exposure to 
destructive chemical substances must 
not be overlooked. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be derived 
from this study: 
1) The Carsington Dam failure arose 
many questions as it could be 
caused by numerous factors which 
can be physical (mechanism of 
failure), chemical (material 
degradation) or administrational 
(construction method). 
2) The stronger the material strength 
(i.e. c’ and Φ’ values) and the 
smaller the pore water pressure in 
the slope the higher the stability 
(factor of safety) of the slope, and 
vice versa. 
3) The failure which took place in the 
dam was likely to have been 
caused by inadequate material 
strength which is influenced by 
certain factors such as lack of 
design and/or construction and 
exposure to destructive chemical 
substances. 
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